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Abstract
The epistemic theory of causality is analogous to epistemic theories of
probability. Most proponents of epistemic probability would argue that one’s
degrees of belief should be calibrated to chances, insofar as one has evidence
of chances. The question arises as to whether causal beliefs should satisfy an
analogous calibration norm. In this paper, I formulate a particular version of
a norm requiring calibration to chances and argue that this norm is the most
fundamental evidential norm for epistemic probability. I then develop an analo-
gous calibration norm for epistemic causality, argue that it is the only evidential
norm required for epistemic causality, and show how an epistemic account of




The epistemic theory of causality interprets causality in terms of rational belief
(Williamson, 2005, Chapter 9). This view is analogous to that of various epistemic
theories of probability (including subjective Bayesianism, objective Bayesianism and
certain theories of imprecise probability), which interpret probability in terms of
rational strength of belief.
Epistemic theories of probability need to provide some account of how these
probabilistic beliefs ought to ﬁt the available evidence. For example, epistemic
theories of probability often hold that strengths of belief ought to be calibrated to
chances, insofar as there is evidence of chances. Similarly, an epistemic theory of
causality needs to provide an account of how causal beliefs ought to ﬁt the available
evidence. The main aim of this paper is to put forward such an account.
§2 introduces the analogy between epistemic causality and epistemic probability.
§3 argues that one particular norm for calibrating probabilistic beliefs to chances
is fundamental to epistemic probability. §4 develops an analogous calibration norm
for epistemic causality, argues that this norm is the only evidential norm that is
needed for epistemic causality, and develops an epistemic analysis of objective cau-
sation. Along the way, we encounter some disanalogies between epistemic causality
and epistemic probability, which are summarised in §5.
Although this paper is not the place to mount a full defence of epistemic causal-
ity, an appendix outlines some motivation for the theory and discusses its relation
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to other theories of causality, for the beneﬁt of readers who are unfamiliar with
epistemic causality.
§2
From epistemic probability to epistemic causality
Epistemic theories of probability interpret certain probabilistic claims as saying
something about strength of belief: roughly speaking, a claim such as the probability
that the patient will recover is 0.7 is correct insofar as, given the available evidence,
it is reasonable to believe to degree 0.7 that the patient will recover.
Epistemic theories of probability deem strength of belief to be reasonable or
rational just when it satisﬁes certain norms. These norms are often chosen on the
grounds that their adherence leads to beliefs that are epistemically or pragmatically
optimal—beliefs that minimise epistemic inaccuracy (see, e.g., Pettigrew, 2016), or
that avoid avoidable losses (e.g., Williamson, 2017, Chapter 9), for instance. Diﬀerent
epistemic theories of probability diﬀer as to what counts as rational strength of
belief, because they impose diﬀerent sets of norms. Norms on strength of belief can
be classiﬁed into four categories, as follows.
Structural norms impose constraints on the structure of one’s strengths of belief.
For example, subjective and objective Bayesianism hold that strengths of belief
should be representable by a probability function, while imprecise probability holds
that they should be representable by a non-empty set of probability functions.
Evidential norms explicate the way in which the available evidence imposes
constraints on strength of belief. For example: if A is in one’s body of evidence then
one ought to fully believe A. Another such norm says that, if one’s body of evidence
E determines that the chance of A is x (which I shall write as P∗(A)= x), then one
should believe A to degree x. This latter norm is sometimes called a calibration
norm, because it requires that strengths of belief be calibrated to chances, insofar
as one has evidence of them. Calibration norms will be explored in more detail in
subsequent sections of this paper.
Equivocation norms are constraints on strength of belief imposed by lack of evi-
dence: these tend to rule out extreme degrees of belief in favour of more equivocal
degrees of belief, in situations where the evidential norms do not force extreme
degrees of belief. For example, Regularity says that one should reserve probability 1
for those propositions that are logical consequences of one’s evidence base. Subjec-
tivists tend to disavow stronger equivocation norms, but some objective Bayesians
advocate the Principle of Indiﬀerence, which says that, given a partition of basic
expressible propositions that are treated symmetrically by the evidence, one ought
to believe each such proposition to the same degree. Some objective Bayesians en-
dorse a generalisation, the Maximum Entropy Principle, which says that strength of
belief should be captured by probability functions with maximum entropy, from all
those that satisfy structural and evidential norms. Some objectivist imprecise prob-
abilists, on the other hand, impose an equivocation norm that says that strength
of belief should be captured by the set of all probability functions which satisfy
constraints imposed by evidential norms.
Finally, diachronic norms govern changes in strength of belief as evidence changes.
Subjective Bayesians and imprecise probabilists tend to endorse Bayesian condition-
alisation or some generalisation of Bayesian conditionalisation here, while objective
Bayesians who advocate the maximum entropy principle do not need a further di-
achronic norm: they can say that one should simply maximise entropy afresh with
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respect to the new evidence in order to determine new degrees of belief (Williamson,
2010, Chapter 4).
These norms ensure that rational strength of belief depends partly on the extent
and limits of the evidence E, and, according to certain epistemic theories, partly
on subjective inclinations of the agent.
Epistemic causality can be introduced by analogy to epistemic probability.
Causal claims are interpreted as another kind of belief. According to an epis-
temic theory of probability, a probabilistic claim is interpreted as a relational belief
of the form PE(A) = x, where x ∈ [0.1], or, in the case of imprecise probability,
PE(A) = y, where ; 6= y ⊆ [0.1]. Similarly, according to an epistemic theory of
causality, a causal claim F is a cause of G is interpreted as a relational belief of the
form CE(F,G). These probabilistic and causal beliefs are not beliefs about proba-
bility or causality—not the belief that the probability of A is x, or the belief that F
is a cause of G. Rather, these relational beliefs are kinds of belief: PE(A) = x ex-
presses a quantitative belief that motivates certain predictions, bets and decisions;
similarly, CE(F,G) expresses a qualitative belief that motivates a particular range
of predictions, explanations and control inferences. These two kinds of belief are
thus characterised by their distinctive links to inference and action.
One view has it that the right combination of norms on probabilistic beliefs is
the combination that yields, on balance, optimal predictions, bets and decisions.
Analogously, one might suggest that the right combination of norms on causal be-
liefs is the combination that yields, on balance, optimal predictions, explanations
and control inferences. In either case, one can only theorise as to the right combi-
nation of norms.
A range of epistemic theories of causality can be developed by selecting norms
analogous to those invoked by epistemic theories of probability, as follows. What we
might call precise epistemic causality would include a structural norm that says that
one’s causal beliefs on evidence E should be representable by a single relation CE
induced by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) on the set of cause and eﬀect variables.
Imprecise epistemic causality, in contrast, might hold that causal beliefs should be
representable by a set of such DAG relations. Subjective epistemic causality would
not advocate an equivocation norm, while objective epistemic causality would: such a
norm would rule a committal causal claim unreasonable in the absence of evidence
that forces such a commitment.
While Williamson (2005, Chapter 9) develops an objective, precise epistemic
theory of causality, in this paper I will defend an imprecise account. As in the case
of the objective Bayesian theory of probability, the advocate of an objective epis-
temic theory of causality may well be able to do without a distinct diachronic norm,
by endorsing the repeated use of the synchronic norms that track the changing ev-
idence. On the other hand, no epistemic theory can avoid endorsing an evidential
norm—any epistemic theory of causality must say something about the constraints
that the available evidence imposes on rational causal beliefs. The main aim of the
present paper is to make headway with this question of how to ﬁt causal beliefs to
available evidence.
We will also further the goal of understanding causality simpliciter. While epis-
temic accounts of probability and causality focus primarily on the probabilistic and
causal claims of a particular agent with particular evidence, it might also be pos-
sible to use such accounts to analyse unrelativised probabilistic and causal claims.
According to such an analysis, the present chance of A is x just in case, were one
to have ideal evidence that includes the complete history so far (all particular mat-
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ters of fact up to the present) and the ability to correctly infer chances from this
complete history (i.e., were one able to correctly invoke all facts about how chances
depend on this history), and were one to satisfy norms on rational strength of belief,
one would believe A to degree x. Such an analysis would view chance facts as facts
about rational degree of belief (Lewis, 1980, pp. 109–113). Analogously, one might
hold that F is a cause of G just when, were one to have ideal evidence consisting of
the complete history (all particular matters of fact) and the ability to correctly infer
causal claims from this complete history (i.e., were one able to correctly invoke all
facts about how causal relationships depend on this history), and were one to satisfy
norms on rational causal beliefs, one would have the causal belief F is a cause of G.
As I shall argue in §4.3, this characterisation has the potential provide an analysis
of agent-independent causation. According to such an analysis, the causal facts are
facts about rational causal beliefs.
§3
Calibration norms for epistemic probability
Having introduced epistemic causality and its relation to epistemic probability, let
us now turn to the question of how to ﬁt probabilistic beliefs to evidence. The aim
will be to learn from the case of probabilistic beliefs, which will be explored in this
section, in order to be in a position to develop an account of evidential norms for
causal beliefs in the next section.
First, some general remarks about evidence. There is little agreement as to what
evidence is. For example, some hold that an agent’s evidence is what she knows
(Williamson, 2000), others that her evidence is constituted by her true beliefs (Mi-
tova, 2017), or her credences that are set by observation (Jeﬀrey, 2004), or her
information (Rowbottom, 2014), or what she rationally grants (Williamson, 2015).
Here I shall remain neutral between these positions. Moreover, there is disagree-
ment with regard to whether only true propositions qualify as evidence. Again,
I shall take no stance on this question here. There is also little agreement as to
whether, where a proposition is established on the basis of an agent’s evidence, that
proposition is also evidence. Again, I shall remain neutral about this, calling the
notion of evidence that is closed under establishing further propositions the agent’s
body of evidence, E, and the notion of evidence that provides the primary grounds
for whatever else is established the agent’s evidence base, B. I shall take the body of
evidence E to be a consistent set of propositions about possible states of aﬀairs up
to the present time, such that a proposition is in E if (a) it is in the agent’s evidence
base B, or (b) the agent is rationally required to infer it from B, if pressed, or (c) she
is rationally permitted to infer it and she does in fact infer it or she would infer it
if pressed. According to this picture, there is an inferential mapping B 7−→ E from
the agent’s evidence base to her body of evidence that depends partly on what she
is rationally required to infer and partly on what she is disposed to infer. These
inferences may depend on the agent’s utilities: e.g., the greater the disutility of er-
roneously inferring a false proposition, the more cautious the agent might be in her
inferences.
§3.1. Chance Calibration
As discussed above, one central evidential norm for epistemic probability requires
calibration of strengths of belief to chances, insofar as there is evidence of these
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chances. I shall explicate this norm as follows (see, e.g., Williamson, 2010, §2.3):
Chance Calibration. If, according to E, the current chance function P∗ lies within
some set P∗ of probability functions, P∗ ∈ P∗, then one’s belief function PE
should lie within the convex hull 〈P∗〉 of that set, PE ∈ 〈P∗〉.
Chance Calibration is closely related to David Lewis’ Principal Principle (Lewis,
1980):
Principal Principle. P(A|XF)= x, where X says that the chance at time t of propo-
sition A is x, P∗t (A)= x, and F is any proposition that is compatible with X
and admissible at time t.
The Principal Principle can be thought of as a kind calibration norm if one invokes
the commonly-held assumption that conditional beliefs are conditional probabili-
ties:
CBCP. PE(A) = P(A|E), where P is a probability function that is rational in the
total absence of evidence.
To see the connection between Chance Calibration and the Principal Principle, note
ﬁrst that one cannot currently possess evidence that is inadmissible or incompatible
with the current chances: current evidence cannot tell one more about the truth of
a proposition than can the current chances. Indeed, Lewis (1980, pp. 92–96) argues
that matters of particular fact up to the present are always admissible with respect
to the present chances. Thus if the present body of evidence E = XF and t is the
present time then F is admissible. Furthermore, F is compatible with X , since body
of evidence E is a consistent set of propositions. Hence CBCP and the Principal
Principle imply that PE(A)= P(A|XF)= x. This is just what is required by Chance
Calibration. More generally, if Y says that the chance of A at t lies in some set y
of probabilities and E =YF then CBCP and the Principal Principle imply that

















This is in the convex hull 〈y〉 of y because P(X | YF) ∈ [0,1] and ∫x∈yP(X |
YF) dx = 1. Thus Chance Calibration can be viewed as a consequence of the
Principal Principle and CBCP.
Conversely, Chance Calibration implies the evidential content of the Principal
Principle, in the context of CBCP. Suppose body of evidence E = XF . As explained
above, F is admissible and compatible with X , so E determines that P∗ ⊆ {P :
P(A)= x}. Chance Calibration requires that PE ∈ 〈P∗〉, which implies that PE(A)=
x. By CBCP, P(A|XF) = PE(A) = x. This is just what is required by the Principal
Principle. Hence Chance Calibration and the Principal Principle can be viewed as
diﬀerent but equivalent explications of the same evidential norm.
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Chance Calibration might be thought of as preferable to the Principal Principle
as an explication of a norm requiring calibration to chances because it does not
require CBCP. Arguably, CBCP is poorly suited to objective Bayesianism because
it can conﬂict with the Maximum Entropy Principle (Friedman and Shimony, 1971;
Williamson, 2010, Chapter 4). Moreover, Hawthorne et al. (2017) have argued that
the Principal Principle in combination with CBCP is not suited to subjective Bayes-
ianism because, under certain auxiliary assumptions about admissibility, it implies
the Principle of Indiﬀerence, which is a kind of equivocation norm. Hence the Prin-
cipal Principle, which requires CBCP if it is to play the role of an evidential norm,
is on shakier ground than Chance Calibration, which doesn’t depend on CBCP.
Chance Calibration has an additional advantage over the Principal Principle.
The Principal Principle can only apply where chance statements are elements of the
domain of the agent’s belief function, while Chance Calibration applies indepen-
dently of the agent’s beliefs about chances. To insist that the agent has determinate
beliefs about all chance propositions is neither realistic nor a normative ideal—
quite the opposite, in fact. In the case of both artiﬁcial and human agents there
are very good grounds for keeping the domain of expressible propositions under
control: probabilistic inference is computationally complex and this complexity in-
creases exponentially in the size of the domain. Therefore, the normative ideal is
that the size of the domain of the probability function be no larger than strictly
necessary. This favours Chance Calibration.
An advocate of the Principal Principle might put forward the following two con-
siderations in its defence. Firstly, it is quite compatible with the Principal Principle
that some chances are not in the domain of the belief function. In such a situation,
the Principal Principle will be silent about which degrees of belief are appropriate.
So there is a sense in which the Principal Principle is less demanding than Chance
Calibration: it does not force any speciﬁc degrees of belief in this case.1 In re-
sponse, note that this behaviour is not what we want from an evidential norm. If
A is in the domain of the belief function and there is evidence that P∗(A)= x but
P∗(A)= x is not expressible in the domain of the belief function, it is nevertheless
clearly appropriate to believe A to degree x. We would want an evidential norm
to reﬂect this. Chance Calibration does provide this constraint but the Principal
Principle does not. So the Principal Principle fares worse in such a situation after
all.
Second, one might think that the Principal Principle has the following advantage
over Chance Calibration: it does not presume that the domain of the chance func-
tion P∗ is the same as the domain of the belief function PE . This is important if
certain propositions about which we can form beliefs do not have chances. However,
this advantage is illusory: Chance Calibration does not require this presumption.
Suppose P is the set of belief functions. In the formulation of Chance Calibration,
simply take P∗ to be that subset of P that satisﬁes constraints imposed by evidence
of chances. For example, if evidence determines just that the current chance of A is
x, P∗(A)= x, then P∗ = {P ∈P : P(A)= x}. There is no need to assume that chances
are deﬁned on all elements of the domain of the belief function.
In sum, Chance Calibration requires neither CBCP nor that chance propositions
be the objects of beliefs; these considerations make it a better general evidential
norm for epistemic probability than the Principal Principle.
1I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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§3.2. Other evidential norms
Thus far we have considered Chance Calibration and the Principal Principle as two
explications of a norm requiring calibration to chances and suggested that Chance
Calibration is preferable. We shall now turn to other forms of evidential norm. I
shall argue in this section that other evidential norms are less fundamental than
Chance Calibration. An analogue of Chance Calibration will thus be a natural
starting point when devising an evidential norm for epistemic causality in §4.
First let us consider a very simple evidential norm: believe your evidence, i.e.,
if A ∈ E then one ought to fully believe A, PE(A) = 1. This norm is routinely
advocated by Bayesians of all stripes and it follows from CBCP. This norm is a con-
sequence of Chance Calibration: if A ∈ E then one would be reasonably expected
to infer, if pressed, that the current chance of A is 1, so Chance Calibration requires
that PE(A)= 1. Thus the believe-your-evidence norm can be viewed as superﬂuous
in the presence of Chance Calibration.
Chance Calibration can also be considered to be more fundamental than other
deference norms. Chance Calibration says that one should defer to chances—
insofar as one has evidence of them—when assigning degrees of belief. But in the
absence of chances one should arguably defer to other quantities, such as long-run
frequencies in appropriate reference classes. Similarly, one might also defer to the
degrees of belief of experts on propositions within their domain of expertise.
Deference norms have the following general structure:
Deference. If body of evidence E =YF where Y is ϕ(A, y), then PE(A)= y, as long
as F is admissible with respect to Y .
Chance Calibration and the Principal Principle can be thought of as deference
norms, where ϕ(A, y) says that the current chance of A is y.2 In the other cases
considered above, ϕ(A, y) says that the long-run frequency of A-like outcomes is y,
or that an appropriate expert believes A to degree y.
There is a sense in which Chance Calibration is the most fundamental defer-
ence norm. In the absence of the precise chances themselves, it is rational to defer
to quantities other than chance—e.g., long-run frequencies and expert credences—
only because these quantities tell us something about chances. That long-run fre-
quencies are good indicators of chances is witnessed by convergence theorems such
as the Central Limit Theorem. Similarly, we defer to experts when their degrees of
belief are likely to be better estimates of the chances than one’s own. In general, we
defer to quantities of which we have evidence when these quantities are indicators
of chances.
There is another sense in which Chance Calibration is fundamental. Chance
Calibration trumps these other deference norms where conﬂicts arise. Suppose
there is evidence Y of a long-run frequency or expert degree of belief and PYF (A)=
2One might worry that Chance Calibration does not qualify as a deference norm, because (1) it
admits the possibility of chance propositions that are not in the domain of one’s belief function, (2)
one cannot entertain a chance proposition that is not in the domain of one’s belief function, and (3)
one cannot defer to a chance proposition if one cannot entertain it. (I am grateful to a referee for this
suggestion.) Against (2), however, one does not have to be able to settle the question of how strongly one
believes a proposition in order to entertain it. Arguably, it is enough that the chance proposition is in
one’s body of evidence for it to be entertainable: if it is in one’s evidence base then—at least under most
conceptions of evidence—it is entertained; if one infers it (or would be disposed to infer it, if pressed)
from one’s evidence base, it is entertainable; and if one is rationally required to infer it, one should be
able to infer it, so it is entertainable.
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y. If, in addition, there is evidence X that determines that the chance of A is
x, where x 6= y, then this chance information screens oﬀ the frequency or expert
evidence from A, i.e., PXYF (A) = x 6= y. To put it another way, YF is admissible
with respect to X , but XF is inadmissible with respect to Y . This is because we
only defer to frequencies or expert degrees of belief insofar as they are indicators
of chances.
In response to this claim, one might object that there are other things to which
one ought to defer and which cannot be viewed as screened oﬀ by present chances.
For example, suppose ϕ(A, y) says that one’s degree of belief tomorrow in A is y. It
is far from clear that this information would be trumped by present chances: one
might have more or better evidence tomorrow, in which case one should arguably
pay attention now to the consequences of that evidence, even if one knows the
present chances. Tomorrow’s credences may tell us about tomorrow’s chances, and
information about tomorrow’s chances would trump evidence of the today’s chances,
where a conﬂict arises.
All this may be true, but there are limits as to the evidence one can have
today. As noted above, current evidence is always admissible with respect to a
claim X about current chances. One clearly cannot possess as evidence today
information about tomorrow’s chances that is not also information about today’s
chances. Thus Chance Calibration still reigns as the primary evidential norm: it
governs the constraints imposed by current evidence. Perhaps one should defer to
one’s future credences—if so, this norm (sometimes called the reﬂection principle) is
a diachronic norm, not an evidential norm, according to the classiﬁcation of §2.
In sum, Chance Calibration is the most fundamental evidential norm. Given
Chance Calibration, there is no need for either the Principal Principle or the believe-
your-evidence norm, and Chance Calibration both motivates and trumps other
evidential deference norms. Given this, our strategy for developing an evidential
norm for epistemic causality in §4 will be to develop a causal analogue of Chance
Calibration.
Before moving on, two points are worth noting. First, although I have argued
that Chance Calibration is the most fundamental evidential norm for epistemic
probability, this does not imply that other deference norms are redundant or elim-
inable. Consider the case where the truth of a proposition A of interest is already
determined, because it is a proposition about the past. Then the present chance of
A is 0 or 1 and, in the absence of evidence that decides between these two possibil-
ities, Chance Calibration merely implies that PE(A) ∈ 〈{P : P(A) = 0 or 1}〉 = [0,1]
and so provides no substantive constraint. In such a situation, it remains appro-
priate to defer to evidence of the long run frequency of A-like outcomes, or to the
credence in A of someone with expertise relating to A. Such quantities cannot be
viewed as estimates of the present chance: e.g., if the frequency or credence is 0.53,
say, then it is clear that this value is nowhere near the present chance value, which is
0 or 1. Hence Chance Calibration does not say anything about whether one should
calibrate one’s degree of belief in A to such a value. Stand-alone deference norms
are required in order to ensure deference to such quantities.
Second, although Chance Calibration is straightforward to state, this does not
make the epistemology of chance a simple matter. Indicators of chances include
conﬁrmed theory (e.g., conﬁrmed physical theory can inform estimates of the chances
of radioactive decay) and physical symmetries (e.g., the symmetries and mass dis-
tribution of a die can inform estimates of the chances of rolling a 5) as well as
long-run frequencies, actual frequencies and expert beliefs. The picture then is that
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we have a complex epistemology of chances which appeals to wide variety of indi-
cators of chances in order to infer the set P∗ from evidence base B. This picture
is made more complex still because an agent’s set P∗ of evidentially-compatible
chance functions will typically depend on her utilities as well as her evidence base
(Williamson, 2017, §7.2). For example, the greater the disutility of erroneously ex-
cluding the true chance function, the more inclusive P∗ will be. On the other hand,
the greater the disutility of continuing to entertain many false chance hypothe-
ses, the less inclusive P∗ will be. This agent-relative chance epistemology can be
thought of as a mapping B 7−→P∗ from an evidence base to a set of possible chance
functions that are compatible with that evidence base. This mapping is induced
by the mapping B 7−→E from evidence base to body of evidence, discussed above.
Chance Calibration itself says nothing about what the mapping B 7−→ P∗ ought
to look like; it is left to statistical theory to provide normative constraints on this
mapping.
§3.3. The epistemic analysis of chance
At the end of §2 we saw that one view of chance has it that the present chances
are rational degrees of belief on ideal evidence E∗, which contains ideal inferences
to chances from the complete history so far. These ideal inferences can be thought
of as the product of an ideal mapping B∗ 7−→∗ P∗, where B∗ speciﬁes all matters of
particular fact up to the present. Then the chance P∗(A)= x just when PE∗ (A)= x
for every belief function PE∗ that is rational on the basis of evidence E∗.
A circularity worry emerges on such an interpretation of chance: Chance Cali-
bration appeals to chances to constrain rational degree of belief, yet chances them-
selves are interpreted as rational degrees of belief. However, this circularity need
not be pernicious. The facts about chances that are presupposed by this account
are encapsulated in the mapping 7−→∗ . Classical statistical theory aims to provide
an independent characterisation of this mapping: it allows us to draw inferences
about chances from an evidence base without appeal to rational degree of belief.
There is thus an independent handle on what is presupposed about chance and no
problematic circularity arises.
There is a second concern with this account of chance. We saw above that a
mapping B 7−→ P∗ may be agent-relative to some extent: it might depend on the
disutility of erroneously excluding the true chance hypothesis, or of continuing to
entertain many false chance hypotheses, for example. If so, then the possibility
arises that the ideal mapping B∗ 7−→∗ P∗ also varies according to the epistemic
context. This would induce relativity in the chance function P∗ = PE∗ . The worry
is that this analysis then fails to provide an adequate interpretation of chance, which
is normally taken to be agent-independent.
In response, one can consider two diﬀerent possibilities. The ﬁrst possibility is
that agent-dependence does not arise after all. Perhaps agent-dependent consider-
ations get washed out as evidence increases. Or perhaps they fail to arise in the
ﬁrst place on certain accounts of evidence. For instance, on an account in which
evidence is factive, the evidence cannot exclude the true chance hypothesis, so the
disutility of erroneously excluding the true chance hypothesis is not a consideration.
Under such scenarios, the ideal evidence E∗ is indeed agent-independent and no
diﬃculty arises for the analysis of chance here. The second possibility is that agent-
dependent factors are not entirely eradicated. In such a case one can either bite the
bullet and say that chances are agent-dependent to some extent, or one can take
9
the chances to be those credences on ideal evidence that are agent-independent, in
which case the chance function is only partially deﬁned. Neither option poses an
insuperable problem for the analysis. (The characterisation of chance given above
took the latter course.)
There is another key problem for this analysis of chance—the problem of un-
dermining futures (see, e.g., Finn, 2014; Belot, 2016). The worry is that the ideal
mapping 7−→∗ depends on the entire history of the universe, rather than merely on
matters of particular fact up to the present, so there may be a non-zero present
chance (as determined by this mapping) that the universe will turn out in such a
way that the mapping, and hence the present chances, are diﬀerent.
I shall set this problem aside. For the purposes of this paper, we only need to
consider those aspects of the epistemic analysis of chance that carry over to the
analogous analysis of causality, and, as we shall see, the problem of undermining
futures does not carry over. Hence we shall not consider this problem in any detail
and I shall leave open the question of whether this analysis of chance succeeds,
focussing instead on the analogous analysis of causation.
Note that an epistemic analysis of chance—if viable—helps to explain why one
should defer to expert credences. An expert’s credences might be the product of
better evidence (an evidence base B′ that is more comprehensive with respect to
the domain of expertise), or may be generated by better inferences (a more reliable
mapping 7−→′ than one’s own mapping 7−→), or both. For example, a professional
weather forecaster has both more data about the weather and good statistical mod-
els for inferring chances from data. On the epistemic analysis of chance, it is very
plausible that more evidence (an evidence base B′ that is closer than one’s own to
B∗) and better statistical inference methods (a mapping 7−→′ that is closer than one’s
own to the ideal mapping 7−→∗ ) are likely to provide better estimates of the chances.
This explains the rationality of deference to expert credences.
§4
Calibration norms for epistemic causality
We are now in a position to consider an evidential norm for epistemic causality.
In the case of probability, I appealed to a distinction between evidence-relative
probability, which I referred to as probabilistic beliefs or degrees of belief, denoted
by PE , and chance, denoted by P∗, which is apparently evidence-independent.
I shall draw a similar distinction here between evidence-relative causal beliefs or
claims, denoted by CE , and an evidence-independent causal relation, denoted by
C∗. I shall call C∗ ‘the’ causal relation and call consequences of C∗ causal facts.
§4.1 will put forward the core evidential norm. §4.2 will explain why this norm
is core. The relation C∗ can itself be analysed in terms of causal beliefs, as we shall
see in §4.3.
§4.1. Causal Calibration
Pursuing the analogy between epistemic probability and epistemic causality, I shall
develop an analogue of the fundamental evidential norm of epistemic probability,
Chance Calibration. Here is a preliminary attempt at a causal analogue of this
norm:
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Causal Calibration (precise version). If, according to E, the causal relation C∗ lies
within some set C∗ of DAG relations, C∗ ∈C∗, then the causal belief relation
CE should lie within the convex hull 〈C∗〉 of that set, CE ∈ 〈C∗〉.
Let us clarify some of the terms that occur within this statement. Recall that
a DAG relation is a binary relation that can be represented by a directed acyclic
graph. Such a relation implies the particular causal relationship F is a cause of G
when there is an arrow from F to G in the DAG that represents the relation.3 For
a set C of DAG relations, let
∧
C be the set of causal relationships that are implied
by every DAG relation in that set, and let
∨
C be the set of causal relationships that
are implied by some DAG relation in C. A DAG relation is in the convex hull 〈C〉
of C if it yields every causal relationship in
∧
C and no causal relationship that is
not in
∨
C.4 I will call the causal relationships in
∧
C∗ established and the causal
relationships that are not in
∨
C∗ ruled out. These two sets constitute the what the
agent takes to be causal facts.
In §2 we saw that one possible structural norm for epistemic causality says that
one’s causal beliefs should be representable by a DAG relation CE . This is what I
called precise epistemic causality. The Causal Calibration norm above is constructed
with this structural norm in mind. However, it is perhaps implausible to hold that
an agent’s causal beliefs should decide every causal question, as would be the case
if her beliefs were representable by a single DAG CE . This consideration warrants
turning to another representation of an agent’s causal beliefs, and so another struc-
tural norm. A variant of Causal Calibration can be devised to correspond to the
alternative structural norm.
A natural approach here is to represent the causal beliefs of an agent on evi-
dence E by a set of causal relations rather than a single causal relation. This yields
imprecise epistemic causality. As noted in §2, the corresponding structural norm re-
quires that causal beliefs be representable by a non-empty set CE of DAG relations.
The corresponding evidential norm would be:
Causal Calibration (imprecise version). If, according to E, the causal relation C∗ lies
within some set C∗ of DAG relations, C∗ ∈ C∗, then the causal belief set CE
should lie within the convex hull 〈C∗〉 of C∗, CE ⊆ 〈C∗〉.
A corresponding equivocation norm would then go on to require that CE = 〈C∗〉,
i.e., to only fully commit to causal relationships that are established by evidence
and to only fully commit to the absence of those causal relationships that are ruled
out by evidence.
§4.2. Other evidential norms
Drawing on the analogy between epistemic causality and epistemic probability, one
might be tempted to consider further norms that use evidence to constrain causal
beliefs. For example: if, according to the evidence, F is a cause of G then one
should have the causal belief F is a cause of G. However, this believe-your-evidence
3According to some views of causality, a DAG relation can imply causal relationships that go beyond
the arrows in the DAG. For example, if causation is taken to be transitive, F is deemed to be a cause of
G just when G is a descendant of F in the DAG. I will not assume transitivity here, leaving this question
open.
4Equivalently, C ∈ 〈C〉 just when the reachability matrix of C is in the convex hull of the reachability
matrices of the members of C.
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norm already follows from Causal Calibration. Suppose evidence E determines that
C∗ lies in a subset C∗ of causal relations that deem F to be a cause of G. Then
F −→ G is in ∧C∗ and so CE deems F to be a cause of G. Hence this norm is
superﬂuous in the context of Causal Calibration.
One might also think that one ought to defer to the causal beliefs of well-
informed, competent experts in situations where one has little direct evidence of
one’s own to go on but one does have evidence of these experts’ causal beliefs.
Considerations about the primacy of Chance Calibration carry over to Causal Cal-
ibration. Where an expert’s causal beliefs disagree with the causal facts, insofar as
one has evidence of them, the latter trump the former in guiding our causal beliefs.
Of course, in the absence of evidence of the causal facts, it may yet be appropriate
to defer to the causal beliefs of experts. However, the motivation behind deference
to the causal claims of appropriate experts is that their causal claims are more likely
to accord with the causal facts than one’s own. Thus one defers to these claims be-
cause they provide evidence of causal facts. Moreover, as in the case of probability,
deference to one’s future causal beliefs would be classiﬁed as a diachronic norm
and not an evidential norm. So there is a sense in which Causal Calibration is the
most fundamental evidential norm for epistemic causality.
We can go further: Causal Calibration is the only evidential norm required for
epistemic causality. Interestingly, the question of whether there is a need for ad-
ditional deference norms exposes a disanalogy between epistemic probability and
epistemic causality. In the case of epistemic probability, we saw that a proposi-
tion whose truth is already determined has present chance 0 or 1 but that it is
reasonable to defer to the credence of an expert, even though such a credence
cannot normally be viewed as an estimate of the chance. A stand-alone deference
norm was required in order to ensure that epistemic probability deems deference
to expert credence to be reasonable. In the case of epistemic causality, in contrast,
an expert’s causal belief can be viewed as an indicator of the relevant causal fact:
there is no mismatch corresponding to the mismatch between non-trivial expert
credences and trivial chances. Given an expert’s causal beliefs, if it is reasonable
to infer something about the causal facts, namely that C∗ ∈C∗ for some subset C∗
of DAG relations, then Causal Calibration itself forces CE ⊆ 〈C∗〉, which is a kind
of deference to the expert’s beliefs. There is no need for an autonomous principle
governing deference to an expert’s causal beliefs. Other indicators of causal facts
include probabilistic dependence and independence relationships, temporal cues,
results of manipulations, and mechanistic connections. For exactly the same rea-
sons, there is no need for stand-alone deference norms that deal with these other
indicators. Causal Calibration is all we need.
Although Causal Calibration is simple to state, we have a complicated episte-
mology of causation which appeals to a wide variety of indicators in order to infer
the set C∗ from evidence E. As in the case of epistemic probability (§3.2), the pic-
ture is made more complex still because the set C∗ of evidentially-compatible causal
relations may depend on the agent’s utilities as well as her evidence base. For exam-
ple, the greater the disutility of erroneously excluding the true causal relation, the
more inclusive C∗ will be. This agent-relative causal epistemology can be thought
of as a mapping B 7−→ C∗ induced by the mapping B 7−→ E introduced at the be-
ginning of §3. Causal Calibration itself says nothing about the mapping B 7−→ C∗;
it is left to scientiﬁc methodology to tell us about this mapping. Parkkinen et al.
(2018), for example, provide some guidance on this mapping that is applicable to
the health sciences and that builds on the techniques of evidence-based medicine.
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§4.3. The epistemic analysis of the causal relation
In §3.3 we considered an analysis of chance in terms of rational degrees of belief
on ideal evidence E∗ consisting of inferences obtained by applying an ideal chance
epistemology to the complete history so far. Although I didn’t endorse this analysis
of chance (which may well fall to the problem of undermining futures), an analogous
analysis of causation is more tenable.
The corresponding analysis of causation takes the causal facts to be determined
by rational causal beliefs on ideal evidence E∗ consisting of ideal inferences to
causal claims from all matters of particular fact. These ideal inferences can be
thought of as a product of an ideal mapping B∗ 7−→∗ C∗, where B∗ speciﬁes all
matters of particular fact (throughout time, rather than merely up to the present
time as was the case with the analysis of chance). Then F is a cause of G just
when it is deemed a cause of G by every relation in CE∗ , i.e., by every causal belief
relation that is rational on the basis of body of evidence E∗.
As in the case of chance, a circularity worry emerges on this analysis of the
causal relation. Causal Calibration appeals to the causal relation C∗ to constrain
rational causal beliefs, yet the causal relation C∗ is itself analysed in terms of
rational causal beliefs. However, as in the case of chance, this circularity need
not be pernicious. The facts about the causal relation that are presupposed by
this account are encapsulated by the mapping 7−→∗ . Methodological theory aims
to provide an independent characterisation of this mapping. Hence there is an
independent handle on what is presupposed about causation, and no problematic
circularity.
There is a second concern with this account of the causal relation. The crucial
mapping B∗ 7−→∗ C∗ may be agent-relative to some extent. In which case, so is E∗
and so are the causal facts, which are deﬁned in terms of CE∗ . The worry is that this
analysis would then fail to provide an adequate interpretation of causation, which
is normally taken to be agent-independent. In response, one can consider two
diﬀerent possibilities. Perhaps agent-dependent considerations get washed out as
evidence increases, or don’t arise in the ﬁrst place on certain accounts of evidence,
and the ideal evidence E∗ is agent-independent after all. If so, there is clearly
no problem here for the analysis of causation. The other possibility is that agent-
dependent factors are not entirely eliminable. In such a case one can either bite the
bullet and say that the causal relation is agent-dependent to some extent, or one
can take the causal facts to be those causal beliefs on ideal evidence that are agent-
independent, in which case the causal relation is only partially deﬁned. Neither
option poses an insuperable problem for the analysis.
There is a further concern that one might have about any epistemic analysis of
the causal relation. We often invoke causal relationships to explain the occurrence
of eﬀects. One might explain the occurrence of G by observing that F is a cause
of G and that F occurred. The worry is that an epistemic notion of cause can’t
explain anything: there needs to be some causal ‘biﬀ’ or ‘oomph’ out there in the
world in order for causation to be explanatory (Williamson, 2013).
Again, the analogy with epistemic probability can help us to address this con-
cern. There is an analogous worry about an epistemic analysis of chance, that can
be allayed by noting that it is not the chance of A that explains the occurrence of
A; rather, it is the activation of a physical mechanism (aka ‘chance setup’) that has
some chance of producing A that explains A. If the epistemic analysis of chance
is right, the chance itself merely encapsulates some facts about which predictions,
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bets and decisions are reasonable in such a situation. To the extent that we ex-
plain by appealing to chances, we do so in an elliptical way: there being a positive
chance of A implies that there is some physical mechanism that can produce A.
Similarly, it is not the fact that F is a cause of G that explains an occurrence of
G, it is the mechanism responsible for G that explains G. The causal relationship
merely encapsulates a range of reasonable predictions, explanations and control
inferences. To the extent that we explain by appealing to causal relationships, we
do so in an elliptical way: F being a cause of G implies that there is some complex
of facts about underlying mechanisms and their activation and/or disactivation that
explains G.
In sum, then, the epistemic analysis of the causal relation developed here can
deal with charges of circularity, agent-relativity and explanatory deﬁciency in pre-
cisely the same way in which an epistemic analysis of chance can deal with them.
On the other hand, while the problem of undermining futures presents a serious
challenge for the epistemic analysis of chance, there is no analogous problem here,
because the causal facts are not time-relative in the way that chances are. This puts




I have argued for Chance Calibration as the fundamental evidential norm for epis-
temic probability and developed Causal Calibration, an evidential norm for epis-
temic causality that is analogous to Chance Calibration. The close analogy between
epistemic probability and epistemic causality has been the guiding light throughout
this paper. However, several diﬀerences have emerged between the two accounts.
Firstly, imprecise epistemic causality has been advocated here, because it is not
possible to used a single DAG to represent non-committal causal beliefs. In contrast,
it is possible to represent non-committal degrees of belief in the framework of
precise epistemic probability: one can equivocate between A and ¬A by adopting
a middling degree of belief in A.
Second, we have seen that while epistemic probability requires deference norms
other than Chance Calibration in order to ensure deference to quantities such as
expert credences and long-run frequencies in situations where chances trivialise,
such norms are superﬂuous in the case of epistemic causality. Causal Calibration is
the only evidential norm that is needed for epistemic causality.
Third, I have suggested that it is possible to analyse the objective causal relation
in terms of rational causal beliefs. This paper sat on the fence with respect to the
analogous question about probability: can one analyse chance in terms of rational
degrees of belief? This was because an epistemic analysis of chance faces a prob-
lem that is not faced by an epistemic analysis of the causal facts: the problem of
undermining futures.
Fourth, while epistemic probability is invariably taken to be an interpretation
of single-case probability, with probabilities attaching to propositions rather than
repeatable events, I have not said anything about whether epistemic causal beliefs
are single-case or generic. This is because that question is orthogonal to the issues
considered here.
This paper has also remained neutral about other important questions. In
particular, I have not endorsed any particular position on the nature or factivity
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of evidence, appealing only to the distinction between an evidence base and a
body of evidence. Moreover, as explained in the appendix, an epistemic account
of causality is compatible with other accounts of causality, just as an epistemic
account of probability is compatible with a physical account of chance, for example.
Finally, I have not taken a stance as to whether to endorse an equivocation norm in
addition to the structural and evidential norms considered here. It is hoped that,
by remaining neutral about these questions, the epistemic theory of causality might
achieve wider interest.
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Appendix: Motivation and relation to other theories of causality
This appendix sketches some motivation for epistemic causality and compares epis-
temic causality to some other theories of causality. For further discussion of the
epistemic theory of causality, see Williamson (2005, 2006a,b, 2013); Russo and
Williamson (2007); Wilde and Williamson (2016).
There are two main ways to motivate epistemic causality: a positive way, which
points to why such an account is natural on its own terms, and a negative way,
which points to deﬁciencies of other theories of causality that are remedied by the
epistemic theory. Let us sketch these lines of argument in turn.
From a positive point of view, it is clear that we do indeed have causal beliefs;
that these beliefs are useful to us because they help us to predict, explain and control
our world; and that some of these beliefs are rational insofar as they are structurally
coherent, compatible with evidence, and don’t go too far beyond the evidence.
These grounds alone render the study of epistemic causality a worthwhile activity.
None of this precludes the viability of other theories of causality. Just as proponents
of epistemic theories of probability often admit objective chances, limiting relative
frequencies, and/or actual frequencies, so too a proponent of epistemic causality can
admit other kinds of causality to which epistemic causality should somehow relate.
On the other hand, should epistemic causality provide a successful interpretation of
our causal claims—perhaps via the analysis of §4.3—, other accounts of causality
might be considered otiose.
This brings us to the more negative point of view. Other theories of causality
are notoriously problematic. The principal accounts of causality can be divided
into association (aka ‘diﬀerence-making’) theories and mechanistic (aka ‘production’)
theories. Association theories include regularity, counterfactual, probabilistic and
agency theories, all of which require as a minimum that cause and eﬀect are prob-
abilistically dependent (Williamson, 2009). These theories face certain particularly
tricky cases of overdetermination where a cause cannot increase the probability of
the eﬀect because the eﬀect will happen anyway (see, e.g., Hall, 2004; Williamson,
2009, §9). Mechanistic theories analyse causality in terms of physical processes
or complex-systems mechanisms. Unfortunately for mechanistic theories, there are
cases where cause and eﬀect cannot be linked by a physical mechanism because one
or other is an absence (Hall, 2004; Williamson, 2011). A disjunctive account, which
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analyses causality in terms of either association or mechanism, will not work either,
because there are cases of causality involving both overdetermination and absences,
which are thus accompanied by neither association nor mechanism (Longworth,
2006). Moreover, causality is not obviously pluralistic in the way that probability
is. When asked for the probability of surviving a certain disease, a doctor might
say something like, ‘70% of people your age survive this disease, but you are partic-
ularly ﬁt and healthy otherwise, so I’m more conﬁdent that you will survive.’ There
is little debate that there are frequencies and credences, that these are both proba-
bilities, and that they can diﬀer. On the other hand, in response to the claim that
the disease aﬀects survival, it seems bizarre to ask whether this is a claim about
association-causality or a claim about mechanistic-causality—this sort of pluralism
about causality is at odds with our use of causal claims.
Association and mechanistic theories of causality also face an epistemological
challenge. Russo and Williamson (2007) argue that, at least in the health sciences,
in order to establish a causal claim one normally needs to establish both that the
putative cause and eﬀect are appropriately associated and that there is a suitable
mechanism linking the two. If correct, this thesis poses a problem for both associa-
tion and mechanistic theories. If an association theory were true, then association
would be suﬃcient for causation: if the putative cause and eﬀect are established
to be associated in the appropriate way, that should be enough to establish causa-
tion, even if it is extremely doubtful that there is any mechanism linking the two.
In practice, however, associations would not be enough to establish the eﬃcacy of
homeopathy or extra-sensory perception because current science casts strong doubt
on the existence of an underlying mechanism of action. Thus association theories
get judgements of causation wrong. Alternatively, if a mechanistic theory were true,
then a mechanism would be suﬃcient for causation: if the putative cause and eﬀect
are found to be linked by an appropriate mechanism, that should be enough to
establish causation, even if it is doubtful that there is any association between the
two. In practice, however, the existence of a mechanism by which a drug interacts
with a disease would not be enough to establish eﬃcacy of the drug where studies
show that the drug makes no signiﬁcant diﬀerence to the disease. Thus mechanistic
theories also get judgements of causation wrong. A simple-minded conjunctive ac-
count of causality, which requires both association and mechanism, would avoid this
epistemological problem. However, the conjunctive account would fall to the coun-
terexamples to association and mechanistic theories, outlined above: some causal
relationships are not accompanied by an association; some have no mechanism.
The epistemic theory of causality is not susceptible to these problems that face
association and mechanistic theories. This is because the epistemic theory does not
analyse causality in terms of association or in terms of mechanism or in terms of
a simple disjunction or conjunction of the two. According to epistemic causality,
causal claims are relative to evidence; this evidence will normally include evidence
of associations as well as evidence of mechanisms; certain causal beliefs will be
rational on the basis of this complex combination of evidence, while others will
not. Associations are indicators, not truth-makers, of causal claims; similarly for
mechanisms.
Note that the positive and negative pathways to epistemic causality are indepen-
dent: a reader wedded to an association or a mechanistic theory of causality may
yet be moved by the positive motivation to take an interest in epistemic causality.
So far, I have considered the relationship between epistemic causality and the
dominant theories of causality, namely association theories, mechanistic theories,
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and pluralistic combinations of the two. Next I shall very brieﬂy sketch the com-
monalities and diﬀerences between epistemic causality and two other theories of
causality: Anscombian pluralism and inferentialism.
Anscombian pluralism takes causal relationships that are characterised by dif-
ferent activities—e.g., scraping and pushing—to be instances of diﬀerent causal
relations. Thus there are many kinds of causal relation—e.g., the scraping relation,
the pushing relation—that are all causal only insofar as they stand in some fam-
ily resemblance to one another (Anscombe, 1971, p. 93; Cartwright, 1999, §5.2.5;
Machamer et al., 2000, §3.1; Cartwright, 2004; Psillos, 2009).
The proponent of an epistemic theory of causality can agree with the Anscom-
bian pluralist that there are many kinds of causing and that there is no simple
reductive analysis of causality to one or other of the indicators of causality. How-
ever, there is no need to endorse causal pluralism, which is implausible for the
reasons alluded to above. Indeed, epistemic causality can be thought of as provid-
ing an account of why all the various kinds of causing are kinds of causing : causal
claims motivate characteristic predictions, explanations and control inferences.
The fact that causal claims motivate certain inferences suggests a connection
between epistemic causality and inferentialism. Reiss (2011, 2012) advocates an
inferentialist theory of causality, according to which the meaning of a causal claim
is characterised by the propositions from which one infers the claim (the inferential
base) and the propositions that one infers from the claim (the inferential target).
However, there are some diﬃculties that face this view (Williamson, 2013, §6).
For example, it is a radically pluralist view: ‘causes’ means diﬀerent things in ‘in-
haling tobacco smoke is a cause of cancer in mice’ and ‘inhaling tobacco smoke
is a cause of cancer in humans’ because the inferential base diﬀers in each case:
randomised trials can be performed in mice but not in humans for ethical reasons,
and so form a part of the inferential base of the former claim but not the latter
claim. There are two main diﬀerences between epistemic causality and inferen-
tialist causality, both of which avoid this awkward consequence. First, epistemic
causality characterises causality in terms of the inferences typically warranted by
causal claims, rather than in terms of the inferential base and target of a particular
causal claim. A second diﬀerence between the inferentialist view and epistemic
causality is that epistemic causality takes only the inferential target to characterise
causal claims—not the inferential base. Thus the discrepancy between the eviden-
tial bases in the case of cancer in mice and cancer in humans does not lead to
multiple concepts of cause. This second diﬀerence ensures that epistemic causal-
ity does not face a further problem for inferentialist causality: on the inferentialist
view one cannot improve the epistemology of causality. According to inferentialism,
when methods for establishing causal claims change, the inferential base changes,
and so does the meaning of ‘cause’. Thus there is no sense in which one can
have better methods for establishing the same causal propositions. For epistemic
causality, on the other hand, the inferential base can change without changing the
meaning of a causal claim.
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